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become inoperative, at least in their classical form, as a result of
the flow of events on the world scene and the progressive
reorganization of relations, through the absorption of ius civitatis
(civil law) into the sphere of ius gentium (international law), with
the progressive move towards the creation of what Kant called
ius cosmopoliticum (the law of world citizenship) in the form of
the United Nations system. He goes on to describe symptoms of a
new shift away from the phase in which this new world order
favored the western maritime powers, mainly the United States,
and contributed to the downfall of the old continental states,
something observed by Carl Schmitt and his many disciples on
the left and the right.
What is now appearing, following the legal defeat of the US over
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and following the rise of actors of the global south to positions of
influence, with their clearly articulated agenda, is a potential
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kind of political potency, realism and wealth to back it up.
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My purpose in this study is to examine the historical interaction
between international theory and practice, and to describe current
characteristics and prospects. The project may not in itself be an
entirely original one, but given the state of academic affairs it
becomes relevant to go over the ground once again.
Two immediate justifications may be mentioned. One is the fact
that the long dominance in the scholarship of realism and neo-
realism (the first grounded in the Hobbesian view of “human
nature”, the second in the “structure” of the system), stretching
from the interwar period (exemplified by EH Carr’s Twenty-Years’
Crisis) through the cold war,1 found itself so heavily contested
with the collapse of the bipolar system that it survives today thanks
to borrowings from such former enemies as institutionalism and
neo-liberalism. This is because the various incarnations of realism
never dealt with the conundrum of unipolarity, a hypothesis which
it basically excluded except as a possible brief interlude during
which the hegemonic power is brought down, and more
importantly, because the founding axiom of neo-realism was the
presumed permanence of the bipolar world.
The second, and more significant one, is the progressive shift in
the discourse of key international actors that has been underway
since the beginning of the twentieth century, and more particularly
since the end of the First World War, resulting in the transmutation
of the principles of civil and, especially, criminal law, over into the
international sphere and engendering a new international discourse.
In this way, a mechanical interpretation of international politics
based on intersecting sovereignties was replaced by a normative
one based on freshly minted absolutes. What is, for the first time in
the discourse of international relations, became what should be, by
the projection of domestic onto international law, and of the latter
onto international politics. Speaking of the western tradition only,
1
 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed., New York: Knopf, 1973;
Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962.
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which ultimately rose to a position of global hegemony, medieval
popes and emperors had never conceded to each other the final say
in defining political legitimacy; on the contrary, they never ceased
to deny it to one another until the rise of Renaissance monarchs
and their Westphalian system put the matter to rest de facto.2 In the
post-Napoleonic period, there was indeed a European Concert, but
it was from the start deeply split between its major actors, and the
Era of Metternich is one in which statesmen of all stripes (including
the one after whom the half-century in question was named) were
always aware of the social contestation that was finally to bring
him and many of his peers down in the revolutions of 1848.
The process whereby existing reality became prescriptive in legal
and moral terms, and whereby Hegel’s dictum “The real is the
rational and the rational is the real” became “the real is the rational
and the rational is the Good,” was prefigured throughout the
nineteenth century, and came to fruition with the 1919 Paris and
1945 San Francisco conferences. It has effected a fundamental
change in the vision and the practice of international law and
politics. Previously dominant theories, specifically liberal
nationalism, Marxism and fascism, have in the past decades been
in large part overcome by world events. On the one hand, therefore,
the balance between theory regarding the international and the
domestic political system has been upended with the former “parent
pauvre,” international theory, becoming now the principal object
of consideration and contention. Meantime, the stuff of speculation
regarding the nature and the teleology of domestic politics has dried
up in the academically hegemonic Western academy, to be replaced
with the principle of eternal return (through the instrumentality of
parliamentary politics and market economics). On the other hand,
the discipline of international relations co-opted many of the former
ideological principles of domestic law and politics, making them
its own, based on the transformation of a system of diplomatic
2
 François L. Ganshof, The Middle Ages: A History of International Relations,
New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 324-328.
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conferences modeled on the Westphalian paradigm (sovereignty,
non-interference, balance of power) into an institutionalized and
legalizing system mediated through international organizations,
notably the UN and its specialized agencies.
It will be argued that the process has not been arrested here, that it
has already overtaken its architects, and that the reinstatement of
Westphalian international politics is now underway, following its
collapse. And we will thus conclude that a unique opportunity has
presented itself with this failure of post-cold war hegemonic policies/
laws. Taking advantage of this failure, a new type of
“tricontinentalism,” first experimented successfully in the 1960s to
mount global, including domestic American, opposition to the
Vietnam war, can reconstitute itself. This post-colonial, post-cold war,
in short, post modern tricontinental is in a position to co-opt the
legalized international system and by taking advantage of the death
of the three major ideological-political models, move to use these
synergies to fill the void in thought and action. That this should be
possible can only be explained as a result of the bankruptcy of
dominant paradigms, all of which originated and flourished in the
West, and their replacement by new, untested ones whose roots plunge
deeply into the contemporary history of the struggle for and against
empire, but also, away from empire, as illustrated by the historians
of the Subaltern Studies Group (SSG) specifically ( an approach trail-
blazed by Ranajit Guha, who convened and coordinated the group),3
3
 Cf. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., Selected Subaltern
Studies, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, especially Guha’s “On Some
Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,” and “The Prose of Counter-
Insurgency,” pp 35-88. For recent writings marked by the SSG’s imprimatur,
see Guha’s History at the Limit of World-History, New York: Columbia
University Press, as well as Heikki Patomaki, “From East to West: Emergent
Global Philosophies – Beginning of the End of Western Dominance?” Theory,
Culture & Society 19(3), 2002, pp.89-111. For the resulting and overdue (modest)
marginalization of Europe, cf. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe:
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1998.
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and postcolonial analyses more generally, in addition to the great
inroads of gender studies in the social sciences and humanities.
The study is divided into three parts: Part One outlines the three
dominant modern modes of thought, with their specific
epistemologies, characteristic of much of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries (liberal nationalism, fascism and Marxism), and
shows how they spawned original theoretical constructs regarding
the international system. Part Two traces the history of that system
since 1815, with its slow evolution during the century which
followed, then its decisive maturation in the wake of World War
one. Part Three analyzes how the course of international politics
resulted in the decline and fall of the three dominant ideological
constructs in the course of the twentieth century. And it will show
how the paradigms managed to stage a comeback on the eve of the
third millennium, although in various guises, a tribute to the general
lack of ideological creativity. While appearing to have collapsed
as explanatory paradigms, liberal nationalism, fascism and Marxism
have resurfaced, in a new form, borrowing from and expanding on
the old, sometimes disguising a beleaguered vision under something
apparently quite different. But the decline and partial resurrection
of these paradigms has created a vacuum nonetheless, in which
various new national and international movements share in the quest
for legitimacy. Among them is the new tricontinental, which is
finding the space in which to develop into a formidable future force.
I. The Three Paradigms
In distinguishing between three sometimes overlapping paradigms
particularly with respect to their international implications, it is
most useful to adopt the categorization of Kenneth Waltz in his
important Man, the State and War.4 In this work, a precursor to
4
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War – A Theoretical Analysis, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959.
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his Theory of International Politics,5 which created and continues
to exemplify the neo-realist school, Waltz distinguishes between
three images of international conflict, in reality, international
relations. The first image explains international relations as an
outcropping of human nature, nearly always seen as intrinsically
evil, or animal (homo homini lupus, “man is a wolf to man”,
explained Thomas Hobbes). The second image bases international
politics on the internal structure of states, and their consequent
interactions, while for the third image, the international system
itself determines the interaction among states, seen largely as
members of the system, or sub-units within it. From the first to
the second to the third image, then, international relations are
dominated by the nature of grouped individuals, or of states, or of
the system of states.
Liberal nationalism
Throughout the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth
century, Hegelianism dominated the scene, and three of its
offshoots vied for audiences: liberal, ‘horizontal’ nationalism
(epitomized by Giuseppe Mazzini’s work and later identified with
Woodrow Wilson); Marxism (Social Democratic or Leninist); and
fascism or ‘vertical’ nationalism in its various incarnations. Various
intermediary or hybrid approaches can be derived from one or a
combination of these three schools even or especially when they
were conceived in opposition to them (Comte, Weber, and others),
but they are subsumed for the purpose of our argument into the
three basic paradigms.
The tenets of liberal nationalism were simple enough, and all were
foreshadowed by Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and
Social Contract. Immanuel Kant wrote his celebrated Perpetual
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
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Peace – A Philosophical Sketch in 1795 based specifically on
Rousseau’s 1761 Project for Perpetual Peace.6 Kant’s conclusions
were landmarks for the following century, with their
interconnected ideas that states should be “republics” (that is to
say, liberal democracies), that they should create an international
federation and thus ensure a lasting peace. In the same landmark
text, he distinguishes between three levels of law, which were
slowly to find their places in the world system: ius civitatis
(domestic law); ius gentium (international law) and ius
cosmopoliticum (the law of world citizenship in the context of
the imagined federation of states). As will be seen below, this
triple separation was effected during the following century and
came to fruition in 1919 with the creation of the League of Nations.
The leading proponent of liberal nationalism was Giuseppe
Mazzini, although he never used the term. Heir to the 1848
revolutions, he prescribed as the solution to problems of civil and
international strife representative rule and the national sovereignty
of states, which would be based on cultural, primarily linguistic
borders. This can be seen in his 1858 Essay on the Duties of Man:7
Your first duties - first as regards importance - are, as I
have already told you, towards Humanity. You are men
before you are either citizens or fathers. If you do not
embrace the whole human family in your affection; if
6
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité
parmi les hommes (1755), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995⁄; Du
contrat social (1762), Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1968. Immanuel Kant,
“Perpetual Peace,” (1795), in Kant, Political Writings, H.S. Reiss, ed., Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 93-115. Rousseau, Extrait du projet
de paix perpétuelle de Monsieur l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1762), translated by
C.E. Vaughan as A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe, London:
Constable and Co., 1917.
7
 Giuseppe Mazzini, An Essay on the Duties of Man, Addressed to Workingmen,
New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1898, pp. 57-59, retrieved from Hanover Historical
Texts Project, http://history.hanover.edu/project.html
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you do not bear witness to your belief in the Unity of
that family, consequent upon the Unity of God, and in
that fraternity among the peoples which is destined to
reduce that Unity to action; if, wheresoever a fellow-
creature suffers, or the dignity of human nature is
violated by falsehood or tyranny - you are not ready, if
able, to aid the unhappy, and do not feel called upon to
combat, if able, for the redemption of the betrayed and
oppressed - you violate your law of life, you
comprehend not that Religion which will be the guide
and blessing of the future.
But, you tell me, you cannot attempt united action,
distinct and divided as you are in language, customs,
tendencies, and capacity. The individual is too
insignificant, and Humanity too vast. The mariner of
Brittany prays to God as he puts to sea; “Help me, my
God! my boat is so small and Thy ocean so wide!”
And this prayer is the true expression of the condition
of each one of you, until you find the means of infinitely
multiplying your forces and powers of action.
This means was provided for you by God when He gave
you a country; when, even as a wise overseer of labour
distributes the various branches of employment
according to the different capacities of the workmen,
he divided Humanity into distinct groups or nuclei upon
the face of the earth, thus creating the germ of
nationalities. Evil governments have disfigured the
Divine design… disfigured it so far that, if we except
England and France, there is not perhaps a single country
whose present boundaries correspond to that design...
But the Divine design will infallibly be realized; natural
divisions and the spontaneous, innate tendencies of the
peoples will take the place of the arbitrary divisions,
sanctioned by evil governments. The map of Europe
will be redrawn. The countries of the peoples, defined
Towards a New Tricontinental?
14
by the vote of free men, will arise upon the ruins of the
countries of kings and privileged castes, and between
these countries harmony and fraternity will exist. And
the common work of Humanity, of general
amelioration, and the gradual discovery and application
of its Law of life, being distributed according to local
and general capacities, will be wrought out in peaceful
and progressive development and advance… In
labouring for our own country on the right principle,
we labour for Humanity. Our country is the fulcrum of
the lever we have to wield for the common good. If we
abandon the fulcrum, we run the risk of rendering
ourselves useless not only to Humanity but to our
country itself.
It can be seen how liberal nationalism from the outset and through
to its culmination in the vision and instruments of the World War
one period, was religiously inspired. Of further relevance to the
present argument is the fact that, following Mazzini, its proponents
put the nationality principle ahead of any social consideration,
meaning that Waltz’s third image in fact applies: the adjustment
of Europe’s (and later, the world’s) borders is a prerequisite to
international peace, and for achieving a just social order, rather
than the reverse:8
There are in Europe two great questions; or, rather, the
question of the transformation of authority, that is to
say, of the Revolution, has assumed two forms; the
question which all have agreed to call social, and the
question of nationalities. The first is more exclusively
agitated in France, the second in the heart of the other
8
 Giuseppe Mazzini, “Europe: Its Condition and Prospects,” (1852), in Essays:
Selected from the Writings, Literary, Political and Religious of Joseph Mazzini,
William Clark, ed., London: Walter Scott, 1880, pp. 266-292, retrieved from
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1852mazzini.htm
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peoples of Europe. I say, which all have agreed to call
social, because, generally speaking, every great
revolution is so far social, that it cannot be accomplished
either in the religious, political, or any other sphere,
without affecting social relations, the sources and the
distribution of wealth; but that which is only a secondary
consequence in political revolutions is now the cause
and the banner of the movement in France. The question
there is now, above all, to establish better relations
between labour and capital, between production and
consumption, between the workman and the
employer…The question of nationality can only be
resolved by destroying the treaties of 1815, and
changing the map of Europe and its public Law. The
question of Nationalities, rightly understood, is the
Alliance of the Peoples; the balance of powers based
upon new foundations; the organisation of the work
that Europe has to accomplish…The map of Europe
has to be remade. This is the key to the present
movement; herein lies the initiative. Before acting, the
instrument for action must be organised; before
building, the ground must be one’s own. The social idea
cannot be realised under any form whatsoever before
this reorganisation of Europe is effected; before the
peoples are free to interrogate themselves; to express
their vocation, and to assure its accomplishment by an
alliance capable of substituting itself for the absolutist
league which now reigns supreme.
Thus Mazzini9 and Woodrow Wilson after him, saw the realization
of the liberal nationalist dream as the single essential prerequisite
for a permanent social as well as international peace (that is to
9
 For the republican-revolutionary roots of liberal nationalism, cf. Eric Hobsbawm,
The Age of Revolution, New York: New American Library, 1962.
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say, as far as Mazzini, is concerned, between European countries
since like most people of his time, he saw no justification in
granting those privileges to non-Europeans, who were best off if
subject to the ‘civilized’ peoples). There would be peace because
the causes of war were based on irredentism, which the national
delineation of borders would eliminate. Later Western-inspired
liberal nationalists, beginning with Woodrow Wilson himself,
extended this prescription to other parts of the world, and finally
to the planetary level.
Such forms of thought may be labeled horizontal nationalism,
because they are applied equally to all parts of the continent/
world, and imply that aggressive behavior stops at the correctly
drawn network of state borders. In its essence, liberal nationalism
is rationalist and positivist, although not necessarily linear,
positing a historical course in which its principles ultimately
prevail and transform the nature of human relations, which are
subordinate to the quality of relations among states. It is premised
upon the Enlightenment idea of human agency, that is to say, the
idea that people can forge their own destinies. This idea, as we
have seen, has a religious rooting, in this case, Voltairean deism,
which sees God as the watchmaker who, once his work was
done, turned His back on the world, leaving people to seek, and
find, the mechanisms which permit the universe/clock to work,
and to fix it if something should be wrong with it. The all-
pervasive influence of the Enlightenment in contemporary
thinking is continuously illustrated, although nowadays often in
a critical, post-modern way.10
This unbounded optimism ascribed agency to members of
existing social formations, meaning of necessity the people
10
 One example among many is to be found in Jeffrey Alexander’s “Modern,
Anti, Post, and Neo: How Intellectuals Explain ‘Our Time’,” in Jeffrey Alexander,
The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005, Ch. 8.
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in general, notably the subaltern groups, along with their
elites, and not, as conventional wisdom has it, simply the
latter. Pierre Bourdieu made a signal contribution with his
theory of fields, within which particular categories of people
operate in accordance with their specific habitus.11 In other
words, the generalization of the role of elites over a society
or a nation is an oversimplification of the very complex form
of interactions among discrete fields, in which therefore, the
elites are broken down into sub-categories. In this perspective,
their global importance in terms of the whole is reduced,
since they are split into disparate and often competing fields.
The top-down perspective has guided the recent literature
on nationalism, including notably the works of Benedict
Anderson and Ernest Gellner,12 implicitly denying agency
on the part of subaltern groups.13
11
 As elaborated in his 1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice (Pierre Bourdieu,
Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2000).
12
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1991 [1983]; Ernest Gellner, Nations
and Nationalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
13
 In this regard, one should consult the groundbreaking work by Miroslav
Hroch,  Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern
Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der
patriotischen Gruppen, Prague: Karls-Universität, 1968; translated as Social
Conditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the
Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European
Nations, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989. See also
Alexander Motyl, “Inventing Invention: The Limits of National Identity
Formation,” in Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, Ronald Grigor
Suny and Michael D. Kennedy, eds., Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University
of Michigan Press, 1999, pp.57-75. In Middle East history, much remains to
be done to overcome the predominant elitist bias. Some efforts have been
made in this regard: see James L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism
and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998.
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Marxism
Marxism posits the hegemony of one social class over all others
in a given society, as well as the inherent dynamic of change (as
opposed to the more or less static quality of nationalist theories)
which brings about a shift in the class composition of a social
formation and, therefore, the transformation or replacement of
the social and political hegemon. There can no longer be a
reification of states which may occur with Waltz’s third image,
since what is meant by “Germany,” for example, is simply the set
of policies worked out by the German bourgeoisie. Varieties of
Marxist thought include or exclude representative democracy as
the necessary conduit for social change, and the stabilization of
the international system likewise passes through the replacement
of a predatory ruling class by another, and finally (for revolutionary
Marxists) the end of social and international oppression by the
disappearance of the class system. Its emergence in the mid-
nineteenth century changed the face of the social sciences, but
also journalism and the writing of history, forever. Marx himself
wrote texts that were economic, sociological, historical and
journalistic in nature. But since it followed in the footsteps of
utopian socialist thinking present since the early part of the
nineteenth century, and based on the most egalitarian strands of
the French revolution (Babeuf and the conspiracy of equals), it
became the point of reference, whether in its later Leninist or its
so-called ‘revisionist’ (actually, a return to the early Marxist)
embodiment. What systematic (some would say vulgar) Marxism
brought to thinking on international politics was the idea that
change would accelerate with the advent of revolution in one of
Europe’s most advanced capitalist economies which Russia at the
time of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions certainly was not. As a
result, the operative Marxist model was amended by Lenin and
the Bolsheviks, to make room for a first revolution in a less
advanced state (Russia) whose role would be to ignite the process
elsewhere. In other words, change was built into the system.
Marxism and its offshoots partake of Waltz’s second image, in
19
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which the internal makeup of states over-determines matters of
war and peace (“Marx and the Marxists represent the fullest
development of the second image”).14 For Marxism in its various
forms, the capital-holding bourgeoisie controls the state, and war
is the external manifestation of this class monopoly. International
affairs as such (or matters relating to what is known today as the
international system), however, as opposed to the workers’
International, or the colonial question, are not at the center of
Marx’s writings. He takes a sociological approach throughout,
seeking prospects for revolutionary change first in Germany: 15
The Communists turn their attention chiefly to
Germany, because that country is on the eve of a
bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out
under more advanced conditions of European
civilization, and with a much more developed
proletariat, than that of England was in the
seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century,
and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will
be but the prelude to an immediately following
proletarian revolution.
Later, hope maybe vested in Russia for specific reasons,16 or even
somewhere in Asia, most likely India, when “the Hindoos
themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the
English yoke altogether.”17 And elsewhere he asks rhetorically,
“can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution
14
 Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 125.
15
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in
Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., New York: W.W.
Norton, 1972, p.500.
16
 “Preface to the Russian Edition of 1882” of the Communist Manifesto, in
Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p.471.
17
 “The Future Results of British Rule in India,” (1853), in Tucker, The Marx-
Engels Reader p.662.
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in the social state of Asia?”18 But the transformational perspective
is always in a sociological and not an international (polemological)
one. Change in one country will have a domino effect on the
working class of another, resulting in emulation rather than war.
Antonio Gramsci represents as always a special case within the
paradigm. By 1926, he had developed a sophisticated view of
international politics (dominated always by concern for reform
and revolution), distinguishing between advanced and peripheral
states in the international system, and the need to deal with each
case differently with an eye to advancing social conditions in
accordance with specific situations, and not simply to demand
unconditional allegiance to the Third International (i.e., the Soviet
Union). This means that his adherence to the principles of the
Waltzian second image was abundantly clear, state-level social
relations being granted uncontested primacy, with priority given
to social reform, always as a prelude to social revolution.19 He
recognizes for example, that what he calls the states which form
the “keystone of the bourgeois system” have a solidly entrenched
ruling class, while “the broad stratum of intermediate classes” in
“the periphery of the capitalist world” might successfully be wooed
to the cause of the proletariat.
Meantime, the link to the international system had become explicit
through Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,
written in mid-World War one:20
“If it were necessary to give the briefest possible
definition of imperialism we should have to say that
18
 “The British Rule in India,” (1853), in Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p.658.
19
 Antonio Gramsci, “A Study of the Italian Situation,” (1926) in Antonio Gramsci,
Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926, New York: International Publishers,
1978, pp.408-411.
20
 Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” Ch. VI, Selected Works,
Volume⁄1, pp.⁄667–766. Quoted from the Lenin Internet Archive 1999. Retrieved
from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/
21
Roger Heacock
imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. Such
a definition would include what is most important, for,
on the one hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a
few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital
of the monopolist associations of industrialists; and,
on the other hand, the division of the world is the
transition from a colonial policy which has extended
without hindrance to territories unseized by any
capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolist
possession of the territory of the world, which has been
completely divided up.
The unstated but obvious dynamic of such global saturation is
war between the monopoly-capital based states, which need to
expand in a non-expanding world, and have thus no choice but
to attack one another in predatory fashion. In other words, the
Great War (which to Lenin and Wilson both was the war to end
all wars by the realiyation of one or the other of the two models
we have discussed so far) was the result of competitive
monopolist possession and acquisitiveness. The destruction of
monopoly capital would be the first step towards ending the
capital-based international state system, and through the
withering away of states, bringing an end to war. Not all Marxist
analyses are as linear as this one, fuelled as it was by the horrors
of the World War. Nonetheless, they clearly base themselves on
the image of an international system resulting from the interaction
of state-level units.
Fascism
Vertical nationalism, which we identify here with fascism, grew
out of liberal nationalism for a variety of historical reasons, above
all the refusal in certain states, of governments to grant full, or
even partial, republican rights to their citizens. The duality between
horizontal and vertical nationalism has been obscured by a recent
generation of theorists of nationalism, whose approach (expressed
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in terms of the “invention” of nations and of nationalism) is in
my opinion deeply flawed, in that it confuses nations and
nationalism, fails to adopt a sufficiently social-historical approach,
and necessarily rejects the vertical/horizontal dychotomy. Even
these scholars cannot escape the fact that nationalism was at first
a movement where “nations dream of being free…,” and that “the
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”21
Unfortunately, they have complicated the study of fascism as a
new construct by equating it with all other forms of nationalism
as a single category of concepts, and made it possible to conclude
that “[f]fascism and other forms of radical-right populisms have
evacuated democracy per se, it is true, but otherwise right-wing
politics have successfully relocated to the formal ground of popular
sovereignty.”22 In other words, leftwing and rightwing, horizontal
and vertical nationalism, are all based on the same type of
democratic-popular theoretical and political base. Such a view is
not convincing, and Habermas23 is correct in pointing out that
[w]ith the French Revolution, then, the meaning of
“nation” was transformed from a prepolitical quantity
into a constitutive feature of the political identity of
the citizens of a democratic polity…The nation of
citizens finds its identity not in ethnic and cultural
commonalities but in the practice of citizens who
actively exercise their rights to participation and
communication.
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Vertical nationalism rose to power in Italy, Germany and elsewhere,
in the wake of and as a frightened answer to the Russian Revolution
and the advent of Soviet Russia. As such, it was the social pendant
of a peculiar type of Darwinism, in which Darwin would have had
great trouble in recognizing “his” thought. It rejected the idea of the
equality of human beings and therefore, of states, to which it applied,
mutatis mutandis, the axiom of the survival of the fittest. For any
number of reasons (racial, religious, civilizational, historical) some
were born or raised to dominate others. Representative democracy
was to be rejected for its misplaced and dangerous egalitarianism.
States were to be organized internally in vertical fashion (the
corporate state, the “Ständestaat,” the clerically or aristocratically-
ruled polity). And states could not be seen as equal to one another.
They were irreducible units based on absolute criteria that made one
incommensurably superior to the others. This form of vertical
nationalism arose in the early twentieth century to challenge the
earlier, liberal/horizontal version, and was to be found in the writings
and policies of the apostles of Italian fascism, German National
Socialism, Spanish Falangism, Portuguese National Syndicalism,
as well as local variations in Hungary, Romania and elsewhere.24
Since the “myth” of democratic theory is rejected, there must be a
hierarchical ordering. This ordering is not based on God-given
characteristics within the given society as in feudalism, because such
an ordering implied rights (for the people) and obligations (for the
rulers) as well as the reverse. This complementarity of rights and
duties had, indeed, also applied to the Renaissance-era “Absolute
Monarchies” which never deserved that particular designation
(“absolute”). Partial responsibility for attaching the stigma must be
24
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attributed to Hobbes, who, because of the depths of depravity he
attached to human nature, based in turn on the terrible bloodletting
of civil war, wanted no limits to the rule of the monarch.
Instead, fascism posits a natural (not God-granted) internal and
international qualitative hierarchy. Rights therefore are at the highest
vertices, obligations at the lowest. In the same way and by extension,
international hegemony is a national right, and becomes an obligation
when it is not a given, an obligation to be carried out through
diplomacy then war. International relations are based on the
fundamental inequality of nations, the primacy of one. The dialectics
of international processes inevitably culminate in war. The classic
formulation by Giovanni Gentile and Benito Mussolini perfectly
sums up the premises of vertical nationalism and shows how it came
as a replacement doctrine for both liberal nationalism and Marxism:25
[Fascism] sees not only the individual but the nation and
the country; individuals and generations bound together
by a moral law, with common traditions and a mission
which suppressing the instinct for life closed in a brief
circle of pleasure, builds up a higher life, founded on
duty, a life free from the limitations of time and space, in
which the individual, by self-sacrifice, the renunciation
of self-interest, by death itself, can achieve that purely
spiritual existence in which his value as a man consists…
Such a conception of life makes Fascism the resolute
negation of the doctrine underlying so-called scientific
and Marxian socialism, the doctrine of historic
materialism which would explain the history of mankind
in terms of the class struggle and by changes in the
processes and instruments of production, to the exclusion
of all else…
25
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After socialism, Fascism trains its guns on the whole block
of democratic ideologies, and rejects both their premises
and their practical applications and implements. Fascism
denies that numbers, as such, can be the determining factor
in human society; it denies the right of numbers to govern
by means of periodical consultations; it asserts the
irremediable and fertile and beneficent inequality of men
who cannot be leveled by any such mechanical and
extrinsic device as universal suffrage…
First of all, as regards the future development of mankind,
and quite apart from all present political considerations.
Fascism does not, generally speaking, believe in the
possibility or utility of perpetual peace. It therefore
discards pacifism as a cloak for cowardly supine
renunciation in contradistinction to self-sacrifice. War
alone keys up all human energies to their maximum
tension and sets the seal of nobility on those peoples who
have the courage to face it. All other tests are substitutes
which never place a man face to face with himself before
the alternative of life or death. Therefore all doctrines
which postulate peace at all costs are incompatible with
Fascism. Equally foreign to the spirit of Fascism, even if
accepted as useful in meeting special political situations
— are all internationalistic or League superstructures
which, as history shows, crumble to the ground whenever
the heart of nations is deeply stirred by sentimental,
idealistic or practical considerations.
In the optics of vertical nationalism, war is therefore the ideal human
state, reflecting the intrinsic Hobbesian relationship, and it cannot
end until the day when the inevitable hegemony has been established
by the elimination of contestation (for Hitler, one thousand years,
that is to say, forever). In fascist theory, the elite becomes a small
minority and finally a minority of one (based on the theory of the
select or elect few, and the majority are marginalized. This system,
according to some thinkers, has projected itself into the contemporary
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era. In the words of Michel de Certeau, “[m]arginality is no longer
limited to minority groups but is rather massive and pervasive.”26
The marginal groups have become an all too silent majority. A careful
reading of the Subaltern Studies approach likewise makes it possible
virtually to identify the subaltern with the majority. Fascism clearly
pertains to the first Waltzian image, because of the key role of the
morally superior individual, surrounded by his party.
In the following section, we will notice how Westphalian Europe,
which premised the primacy of the international system (Waltz’s third
image) was followed, after the destabilizing period of the French
Revolution, by a long period in which efforts to rebuild it during the
nineteenth century through the instrumentality of great power
diplomacy interspersed with limited wars, increasingly featured an
attempt to model the system on the liberal constitution of states
(second image), before succumbing to the Hitlerian onslaught (first
image), then reappearing in 1945 in the form of a legalized system
rooted in nineteenth and twentieth century developments, and summed
up in the United Nations system, with the criminalization of deviant
international behavior, and thus the downfall of the Westphalian
system as well as the collapse of the three dominant paradigms.
II. The Resurrection and Decline of the Westphalian
System, 1815-1914
The so-called Westphalian system consists of three interrelated
elements:
1. Recognition of the notion of sovereignty as the highest form
of allegiance, above which there is no legitimate cross-
state decider (in this way, opposed to the medieval legal
and constitutional principle of Empire, in which the
26
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Emperor was king of kings, and Christ, through His bishop
in Rome, presided over the empire (hence the long struggle
between pope and emperor);
2. The subsequent elevation of the principle of mutual non-
interference in the internal affairs of states through the
extension of “cuius regio, eius religio” (the ruler
determines the religion) to administrative and ideological
issues in general;
3. The balance of power principle as the underlying objective
of the diplomatic or military (peaceful or belligerent)
conduct of international relations. In this way, the
temptation of a return to the medieval empire (now
condemned as international hegemony) was to be banished
once and for all. Conveniently, in the nineteenth century,
Britain could never aspire to continental hegemony and
therefore was the most acceptable balancer.
All along the nineteenth century, Europe (and by extension, the
increasingly European international system) experienced the slow
growth of institutional thinking and practice as it was progressively
interwoven with the very fabric of statecraft.27 By definition,
institutionalization reduces the margin of maneuver in an
international environment where sovereignty, the balance of power
and non-interference are the guiding principles of conduct.
Paradoxically, the reasons why a group of rather conservative
statesmen (around Metternich and Palmerston until 1848,
Napoleon III to 1870, and Bismarck to 1890) should have worked
27
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to transform the system in a way which implicitly threatened the
time-honored Westphalian framework, are linked to their very
desire to preserve it. The Marxian concept whereby the ruling
class digs its own grave seems here to apply in the international
system to those who paved the way to the demise of the European-
centered international system.
The French revolutionary and Napoleonic period presented a
model of European unity imposed from above, modernizing in
most of its effects as would have befitted an Enlightened monarch
in the mold of Frederick or Catherine the Great or Maria Theresa,
as shown by the administrative transformations of Italy and
Germany, which were necessary conditions for their later
unification. It was of course an unacceptable model, because of
its purpose: the subjection of the continent to France and its
imperial ambitions, combined with an emancipatory propaganda
that excited the ire of rulers (and in the case of Russia, most of the
people) of the conquered lands. The Westphalian precepts had
been violated: respect for sovereignty (with the subjection of
Prussia and Austria); non-intervention in ideological affairs; and
of course, preservation of the European balance.
The French geo-strategic as well as ideological quest for hegemony
failed as a result of the time-tested Westphalian system of
coalitions, a series of which rose and fell until they finally felled
Napoleon. The innovation was the replacement of temporary
coalitions with a permanent alliance, intended to last 20 years, in
the form of the 1814 Chaumont Treaty (whose article 16 explicitly
mentioned as a fundamental goal the preservation of the European
equilibrium), confirmed by the Quadruple Alliance of November
1815, the first element of an institutionalized, albeit as yet non-
institutional, European (later world) system. By definition, such
an alliance (twenty years in the future is a generation) meant that
balancing was bound to be threatened, in case France was to be
replaced by another power as the incipient hegemon. That the
treaty in question was signed only by the four greatest Powers
involved in the anti-Napoleonic coalitions (Russia, Austria,
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Prussia, Britain), was in itself a significant development – one
has but to compare the dozens of participants in the previous pan-
European endeavor, the 1648 treaties of Münster and Osnabruck
(Treaties of Westphalia). This showed the progressive reduction
of the notion of the international system to its Great Powers.
The Congress of Vienna, resulting in the Vienna Treaty of June
1815, marked the return to the kind of Westphalian stability based
on the balance, with the reacceptance of France to the concert of
nations, as the fifth acknowledged Great Power. The terms
imposed upon France were remarkably generous. The insistence
upon a restored and discredited Bourbon monarchy, although
inevitable, bode ill for the longer-term stability of the country
and the continent, and, along with the incipient institutionalization
of Chaumont, meant that another Westphalian principle was being
violated, that of non-interference in internal affairs, it having been
understood that in an era of growing national and social sentiment,
internal and external affairs could not be separated clearly. Thus
was born the idea of the Concert of Europe, in fact a European
“Security Council.” Meantime the dynastic principle, a residue
of a millennium of European politics, was still present in force
(and not only in Czar Alexander I’s rather utopian project of the
Holy Alliance), testimony to the weight of tradition as well as the
strength and fear of revolutionary ideas.
The series of four congresses (in contemporary parlance,
conferences) held between 1818 and 1822 in the context of the
Concert of Europe formed the basis for multilateral diplomacy
conducted throughout the rest of the century. They were trend-
setting and gave a clear idea of the new conditions in which
international relations were being conducted. As such, they formed
models for the future. And the Congress system they reflected
was consciously dedicated to preserving the peace in Europe as a
whole and Europe as a concept.28 This Europeanization of the
28
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statesperson’s mission began, consciously, with the creation of
the Congress system. That is to say, it was now seen as a process
based on the handful of state pillars which were the Great Powers,
not exactly from below, but a kind of Europeanization which
marked its difference with Napoleonic Europeanization in which
the summit (the Emperor) joined with the base, the peoples of
Europe. This was a transitional or intermediate type of
Europeanization. The overall goal, of preserving the peace of
Europe, was never abandoned, even though it was left to the Great
Powers to define what was meant by ‘peace’ or rather, what
constituted a challenge to the peace, whether social revolution or
internal borders or external borders. The Great Powers decided
what degree of social revolution was deemed a threat to the
Westphalian system, that is to say, to existing dynasties, and of
course in this regard there were differences between the parties,
either based on ideology (Metternich was more conservative than
any British statesman) or on the perceived threat to one’s own
polity. The Great Powers (self-appointed guardians of the
European order) likewise decided on the shape of Europe. While
the outlying historic powers were always considered part of it
(Russia, Britain and the Ottoman Empire), they might be
augmented or deprived of provinces here and there.
The progressive ascension of Europe to its status of virtually total
world mastery by the end of the nineteenth century signified, along
with the Europeanization of the world, the globalization of the
European order, or the mandate of maintaining peace, no longer
simply in Europe, but in the entire world. In this respect, the four
congresses had been decisive and trend-setting. At Aix-la Chapelle
(Aachen) in 1818, along with the full reinstatement of France
(and the secret continuation of the pact of Four, in case the balance
should be threatened again), was born a principle which would
later be enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine. Czar Alexander was
anxious to help in putting down the generalized uprising against
Spanish rule in the Americas, and found, not only no support, but
active opposition to the idea of restoring legitimate rule there,
spearheaded by Castlereagh. Certainly this constituted resistance
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to what was after all nothing more than what the Great Powers
had vowed to do in Europe, namely, preserve threatened thrones.
It was motivated, on the one hand most certainly by the reality
principle, given the material impossibility of bringing any, and
certainly not all, of the newly independent Latin American states
to heel. But it was more than that: a reincarnation of the 1494
Treaty of Tordesillas, through which for the first time in more
than three centuries the hemispheres were being endowed with
geo-strategic value and mutually exclusive borders. An invisible
line was being drawn in the middle of the Atlantic, one which
would play such an important role thereafter. The British role in
drawing that line, and in inspiring the proclamation of the Monroe
Doctrine, is well known, and it foreshadowed the kind of
globalization  based on extra-European considerations, which
would come to restructure the international system in the twentieth
century. Of utmost relevance is likewise the fact that the dreamer-
Czar introduced other projects which themselves presaged later
developments, and involving generalized disarmament,
international military forces, and a permanent union (although
the purpose of these various schemes would have been to protect
ruling dynasties against their peoples, and not to protect peoples
against aggressive rulers or neighbors).
The second congress took place at Troppau (Opava) in 1820 to
discuss constitutional developments in Spain. The argument, once
again between the Czar and the other participants, concerned the
desirability of resorting to military intervention to suppress the
constitution which had been imposed on the king of Spain. In the
name of Westphalian principles, interventionism was resisted, until
the constitutional movement spread throughout the Iberian peninsula
and to various Italian states, now demanding the restoration of their
former constitutions. In each case, the constitution in question was
the relatively liberal one dating back to the height of Napoleonic
rule, in 1812. At this point, Metternich became convinced that things
were getting out of hand, since an Italian infection was, first of all,
in itself a threat to Habsburg rule in the north, and Spain and
Piedmont were dangerously close to France.
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A third congress, at Laibach (Ljubljana), was duly convoked one
year later. Britain and France maintained the reserve which had
characterized their policies since the outbreak of the crisis, and
the system seemed to lurch towards a revival of ideological
considerations in the conduct of great power diplomacy (liberal
vs. conservative states), or Waltz’s second image. The fourth and
last congress took place in Verona in 1822, having been called in
response to the Greek uprising against Ottoman rule, now one
year old. For Metternich, the balance of power principle excluded
the possibility of assisting the insurgents, while for their own
reasons Russia, France and Britain all contemplated what form
and what limits to give to the assistance for the Greeks. At the
same time France, for dynastic reasons of its own, intervened to
crush the constitutional movement in Spain and restore the
monarch to his previous position. The first halting exercise in
Congress diplomacy had collapsed in a few years, but not without
having left a lasting and a decisive impact on European statesmen,
on Europe and, thereafter, on the world.
While the successive congresses had ended in the breakup of the
Concert of Europe for lack of consensus on how to deal with
issues, and thrown into relief the contradictions between the more
liberal states (Britain and France) and the absolutist ones (Russia
and Austria), they had also been put to use as forums for discussing
vital issues dealing with the slave trade and interstate arbitration,
as well as navigation on inland waterways. They remained as
precedents in the consciousness of European statesmen, and as
models for ulterior developments. And in fact dozens of European
Congresses were held in the course of the “long nineteenth
century” leading up to World War one, whether they came in order
to forestall war, to end it, or to discuss problems related to interstate
relations in time of peace (arbitration, navigation, and so on).
European states now went their own ways, and an ideologically
based division between east and west took place. In most instances
(but only when they were not involved in rivalry overseas, as in
Egypt) France and Britain sided together in the attempt to rein in
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the three Eastern powers, Prussia, Austria and Russia. This could
certainly not be deemed a cold war, but there was indeed a split
between the two limited parliamentary democracies, with their
growing overseas interests, and the purely continental autocracies.
The nineteenth century saw the progression of international politics
based on liberal nationalist premises, as well as efforts by Marxist
and other socialist theorists and groups to ensure the kind of
internationalism which would engender change and guarantee its
direction. 1914 proved to be a significant cutoff point, when all
of the important socialist parties voted war credits, thus aligning
themselves with the liberal nationalists and dealing a first
significant blow to the socialist model.
The League of Nations was the result of accumulated experiences
in the domain of international organization, including institution
building, and fundamentally was the result of the first World War.
The nineteenth century influenced its shape, in combination with
the four years of the war. As in the case of most significant
institutional transformation, the codification of international
organization which took place after 1919 was the combination of
long-term forces at work during periods of calm, and the
cataclysmic upheavals linked to war. Other examples are the
American declaration of independence and constitution or the
institutions of the successive French republics. The Concert of
Europe provided the example of great powers taking up issues
affecting European security, in its four regular conferences and
then, over the decades. This seemed in retrospect like a rehearsal
for the later establishment of the League Council (and UN Security
Council), a directorate of the great powers. The attempt, following
the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, to set up a veritable
“Hague system” was the first concrete effort to establish
institutional facts on the ground. The Hague conference was
originally convened on the initiative (once again!) of the Russian
czar, this time Nicholas II (a courageous but logical move, since
he represented the most peripheral of the great powers), and this
time the conferences were explicitly to organize more effectively
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the state system. By the time of the second conference, dozens of
states were participating. The third one was scheduled for the
year 1914, but never convened because of the war. Already the
spirit of the later League Assembly (and UN General Assembly)
was embodied in the successive Hague Conferences of 1899 and
1907, because of the implicit notion of the equality of all states,
large or small, as envisaged by the liberal democratic model, the
only condition being the Westphalian one of internationally
recognized sovereignty. The number of participating states nearly
doubled from the first to the second conference. These were now
intended to take place every seven years. The ideals of liberal
nationalism can be seen, after one century, to be coming to fruition,
because of the clear distinction between the Hague experiences
and the earlier Concert of Europe system, which had included all
the major powers, and only the major powers. The development
also suited European public opinion, largely pacifist in the early
twentieth century.
With regard to the deeper significance of the Paris settlements of
1919, nothing can be more instructive than a perusal of the collected
papers of Woodrow Wilson’s  closest foreign policy advisor,
Colonel House.29 One gets a picture of the extent to which
Wilsonian idealism pervaded the political decisions and activities
of the American president during the crucial war years, and how a
system which he shaped, largely in opposition to his French and
British allies, was left to be run by those who would most likely
have created something different. The League of Nations is of
course a case in point. The one addition, an essential one not always
recognized for what it was, was the post of General Secretary with
a significant bureaucracy, the secretariat. This was definitely a
departure in legal-political terms, because it constituted the League
as a separate (although not equal or autonomous) partner in the
29
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international system. The position also symbolized the perceived
necessity of unifying the large variety of initiatives, regimes and
organizations under the umbrella of a single Organization.
The League of Nations was like so many innovations, the direct
result of the war itself. Nothing succeeds like success, and its
creation reflected the idea that the unified allied War Council
established late in the war, under the aegis of General Foch, could
be projected forward into the post-war phase in the battle to
preserve the peace.30 And the nature of the peace to be preserved
was the peace of the victors. That is to say, it was not peace in
general, as proposed by Woodrow Wilson while the fighting was
still going on, a peace without victors, based on the need to end
all wars. It was a peace in which the new order (established by
the successive Paris treaties of 1919, particularly Versailles) was
now redefined, in the light of the developments of international
organization culminating in the League, as an upgrading of
domestic, criminal law to the global level.
The scene was now set for the later definition of wars, no longer
as temporary setbacks to the reestablishment of the Westphalian
principles, notably the balance, but also that of non-interference,
but as police actions to restore the legal order when it had been
challenged by revisionist powers. The policemen were by
definition the major Council powers, France on land and Britain
on the seas. Of course this particular peace could not endure,
because it was based on an order those predominant powers could
not maintain since they were falsely hegemonic,31 an appearance
based on centuries of European history, not taking into account
the globalization of the Westphalian system, nor the temporary
retreat of Germany and Soviet Russia, and the lingering
isolationism of the greatest power of the twentieth century, the
30
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United States. This criminalization of revisionist international
politics succeeded in neutralizing specific powers.
The League did not survive the Second World War, not because it
had failed, but because its instruments had not been employed as
they were intended, that is to say, to preserve the existing order.
France and Britain lacked the will, and most certainly the means,
to maintain the hegemony that thanks to the United States they
had won in 1918, because of the latter’s return to isolation. The
widespread idea that the League had failed needs to be revised,
since, like the UN later on, it is a shell that acts in accordance
with the will of its members, most notably the great powers among
them. Indeed, the UN was a reincarnation of the League, with its
basic instruments and bodies, and the addition of some new ones.
In particular, it resurrected the principle of unanimity, in the form
of the veto. What it added was the notion that all of the great
powers should be present at the creation. This was at first
accomplished (Germany did not exist as a sovereign state)
although somewhat later, the dilemma of the League was revived
with the refusal of the United States to accept the legitimacy of
the People’s Republic of China after 1949, something which
immediately contributed to serious instability in the form of the
three-year long Korean war. The liberal nationalist principle was
strengthened in the form of the General Assembly representing
dozens, then a hundred and now nearly two hundred states, and
provisions for voting. But it was powerfully negated, in both theory
and fact, by the primacy given to the Security Council.
Germany was twice defeated even as it was kept out, then kept
itself out, of the international system crafted over a century to
1919. The Soviet Union was once and for all defeated with the
end of the cold war, and despite its inclusion in the international
system rebuilt in 1945 along the lines of that which followed World
War one. In other words, the history of Europe in the 19th century,
culminating in the system devised in Paris in 1919, succeeded in
its intended purpose, as devised by Wilson and his associates of
the time, and despite Wilson’s own purely electoral defeat.
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Woodrow Wilson, although he did not live to see it happen,
sacrificed his own career, then his health, in the service of his
goal, as defined through the testimony of Colonel House. Other
sister powers shared in this victory, and the powers earmarked
for defeat were in fact defeated in the seventy years which followed
1919, with international law and organization in tow.
The criminalization of international politics
It is at this point that one must speak of the intrusion of domestic
into international law, making the latter over as a branch of criminal
law. Violations of the various Paris peace conferences were to be
considered breaches of the peace and thus illegal acts. They were
to be envisaged no longer in the perspective of Westphalian
principles, but in that of the prescriptions of Versailles, Saint-
German, Trianon and Neuilly (the case of Sèvres, although
comparable, is in many ways  contradictory to this rule, because
the victor powers lost out almost immediately to a revisionist
Republican Turkey), to be enforced by a permanent international
actor, the League, indeed the highest international actor, dominated
by France, Britain, and such powers as might be admitted
thereafter, flanked as of 1921 by the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
The peace seen as the extension worldwide of domestic law had
two effects: it negated the longstanding reality of what Carl
Schmitt designates as the Nomos of the earth,32 by which he means
essentially the geo-strategic projection of state power over land.
Nomos is “the immediate form in which the political and social
order of a people is manifested in spatial terms…”  Furthermore,
“in the taking of land, in the foundation of a city or a colony, the
32
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Nomos becomes visible, with which a…people establish
themselves., that is to say, in which it spatializes (verortet) itself
and raises a piece of the world to the level of an order.”33 In other
words the Nomos is both the bounded place and the projected
space of a people. This concept is essential to grasping the present
argument: throughout the nineteenth, then the twentieth centuries,
the ground was being laid for the conceptual transformation of
the international system in line with movements in the field of
international law and organization. Events of the last century
transformed international law in the sense of its juridification, by
which is meant, the extension of precepts taken from civil law to
the international sphere. That sphere was essentially defined by
the historic sea powers, with the European land powers falling by
the wayside one by one. In this way, the Nomos of the land powers
was replaced by the global Nomos of the sea powers (and after
Britain in turn fell by the wayside following World War two, by
the United States).
Hegemony was thus successfully claimed for sea-, and later air-
power (even more global that sea-power). Germany was thus,
beginning in 1919, reduced to dimensions which it was reluctant
to accept, and this, incidentally, was the major problem Schmitt
had with it.34 Just as importantly, the process of encirclement of
the Soviet Union soon began, based on the same revised form of
international legality (it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union
was the only power expelled from the League of Nations), of
which Stalin complained bitterly in the twenties, thirties and
forties, which was nonetheless genuine, and finally resulted in
the physical reduction of Russia, fifty years after the same effect
had been obtained with regard to Germany at the end of World
War two. The ultimate result of the successful war against Eurasian
33
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land powers – Germany, then Russia – appeared to signify the
end of the Westphalian structure with the emergence of a unipolar
world. The resulting vacuum, speaking now of the most recent
phase, following the disappearance of the Soviet Union and its
Nomos, which is nowadays universally labeled an Empire, is what
explains the rise of partially successful alternative challenges, in
the form of non-territorial movements, for example those Islamist
groups which had first been instrumentalized in the struggle to
contain and then destroy Soviet power.
Combined with the idea of the Nomos is the question of the state
of exception, since the powers that have successfully managed to
replace the international system based on contending spatial
projections with one based on a single legal projection, with the
criminalization of non-conformists, are also those who have
institutionalized the state of exception on the same series of
occasions (World War One, the Depression, World War Two, the
Cold War, the War on Terror). Giorgio Agamben, in his State of
Exception,35 takes the concept, which includes martial law,
emergency regulations, rule by decree, and the like, and shows
how pervasive they are, precisely in those countries which
constitutionally are defined as parliamentary or presidential
republics. Slavko Zizek also makes this point:36
“And is it not a fact that…liberal warriors are so eager to fight
antidemocratic fundamentalism that they will end up flinging away
freedom and democracy themselves, if only they can fight terror?
They have such a passion for proving that non-Christian
fundamentalism is the main threat to freedom that they are ready
to fall back on the position that we have to limit our own freedom
here and now, in our allegedly Christian societies. If the “terrorists”
35
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are ready to wreck this world for love of the other, our warriors
on terror are ready to wreck their own democratic world out of
hatred for the Muslim other. Jonathan Alter and Alan Dershowitz
love human dignity so much that they are ready to legalize torture
– the ultimate degradation of human dignity – to defend it.” Zizek
goes on to show that Professor Dershowitz of Harvard University
deploys “utilitarian” arguments (use torture to stem terrorism)
which potentially signify the legitimization of that very
phenomenon which has aroused his ire. “Just as one should torture
a terrorist whose knowledge could prevent the death of many more
innocent people, should one not fully condone terror, at least
against military and police personnel waging an unjust war of
occupation, if it could prevent violence on a much larger scale?”
Agamben shows how George Bush’s September 11th-based
emergency laws are the crystallization of more than a century of
precedent, and the synthesis of constitutional development in such
democracies as the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, based
on an accumulation of events taking place in the shadows and
under the citizens’ noses precisely because of the widespread
liberal positivism of contemporary political discourse. The
development was anticipated by Walter Benjamin, who opposed
it, and Carl Schmitt, who welcomed it. And by the time World
War two came about, even Benjamin welcomed it, saying that “it
is our task to bring about the real [wirklich] state of exception,
and this will improve our position in the struggle against
fascism.”37 The argument was picked up by George Bush speaking
of “Islamo-fascism.” Of course Agamben is quite right, following
Schmitt, to place the exception at the limit between politics and
law, or “the legal form of what cannot have legal form,” with a
semiotic slip in which the “paradigm of security” has replaced
the state of exception. He adds that “it is significant that though
this transformation of the constitutional order (which is today
37
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underway to varying degrees in all the Western democracies) is
perfectly well known to jurists and politicians, it has remained
entirely unnoticed by the citizens. At the very moment when it
would like to give lessons in democracy to different traditions
and cultures, the political culture of the West does not realize that
it has entirely lost its canon.” 38
In parallel to the legalization or juridification of international politics,
we can thus retrace the process of de-legalization of the domestic
order, as shown by Schmitt in his devastating critique of liberalism,
Legality and Legitimacy,39 which draws a clear fault line between
these two categories, ignored by liberal theorists, noting that in
contrast to mere legality, “plebiscitary legitimacy is the single type
of state justification that may be generally acknowledged as valid
today.”40 This might be seen as a statement of fact or of a norm, but
reading to the end one realizes it is a norm:41
“A constitution that…forgoes imposing a substantive
order, but chooses instead to give warring factions,
intellectual circles, and political programs the illusion
of gaining satisfaction legally, of achieving their party
goals and eliminating their enemies, both by legal
means, such a constitution is no longer even possible
today as a dilatory formal compromise; and, as a
practical matter, it would end by destroying its own
legality and legitimacy.”
The process whereby the international arena was endowed with
juridical content is closely linked to that which transformed “liberal”
38
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polities into ones deeply entrenched in the state of exception, for the
stated purpose, in the case of Britain, France or most notably the
United States, of protecting the new international legal order against
those bent on bringing it down. Agamben outlines this historical
enthronement of the state of exception, but fails to point out the
symbiosis between it and the inversely parallel international process.42
Between the middle of the twentieth and the beginning of the
twenty-first centuries, and along with the continental powers, the
paradigms which had presided over political thought and practice
were all defeated as well. They collapsed in the flames of World
War two for fascism, in the end of the Soviet experiment (and even
before it) for the Marxist model, and at the latest September 11th,
2001 for the liberal model. While they have shown their resilience
by restructuring themselves and reappearing, chameleon-like, in
various garbs and guises (fascism in the ‘war on terror’, liberalism
in the politics of the Euopean Union, Marxism in the discourse of
some Latin American states), their former strength is sapped, and
they can no longer compete with other ideological constructs
positing different types of solidarities found in various parts of the
world, such as the international women’s movement, ecology, mass
democracy, and Islamism. This relative political and ideological
void has set the stage for the possible revival of the tricontinental.
III. The new Tricontinental
It is in the context of this collapse of states and paradigms, and of
the rise of unipolarity, that the space has been created for a new
tricontinental. The original tricontinental was an alliance of
progressive countries from the global south, and specifically from
Latin America, Africa and Asia, whose purpose it was to combat
domination and exploitation by northern powers. If Soviet state
42
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capitalism (or “really existing socialism”) couldn’t survive the
cold war, it is not surprising that the coalition of poor third world
tricontinental countries could not do so either. Why should it be
different today? The answer is obvious: the countries of the global
south which make up the new tricontinental, are no longer poor.
Whether one speaks of China, of India, of Brazil, of South Africa,
one no longer is speaking of miserable states that cannot feed
their own people (that they do not always choose to do so is another
matter entirely). They are rapidly joining the club of the rich
countries (once again, regardless of the unequal internal
distribution of that wealth) which govern the affairs of the world
in an era of globalization.
As so often, Immanuel Wallerstein seems to have intuited future
developments when, writing in the early 1970s,43 he defined
what I call the semi-periphery, that is all those states
who play an intermediate role in the world-economy:
large along at least one crucial dimension
(population, skilled manpower, total industrial
output, per capita income)…
There are a large number of such countries in the world
today: Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico; Algeria, Egypt,
and Saudi Arabia; Iran, India and Indonesia; Nigeria,
Zaïre, and South Africa; and, yes, Canada.
With the exception of Canada (and the listed Arab countries, which
have all since chosen to ensconce themselves in the American
camp, as well as the war-ravaged Democratic Republic of the
Congo - Zaïre), the list is remarkably in line with the recent
emergence of a powerful potential tricontinental. Understandably,
he left China off of the list, because its economic and political
43
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evolution, which propelled it to the very top, was not yet visible.
And while he could not foresee the extraordinary economic and
technological transformations which would give them power far
beyond that which he attributed to them (as sources of raw
materials, benefiting from world economic downturns only), he
did unerringly identify a phenomenon of differentiation within
the global South that has today become palpable.
The foundations of the new tricontinental are constituted by the
archaeology of the old paradigms, which are not strong enough
anymore to condition policies or even to convince the bourgeois
practitioners of Habermas’s beloved “public sphere,”44 that is to
say the cultural, economic and political elites identified by
Bourdieu.45 In addition to the rising states of the tricontinental,
always in opposition to what Hardt and Negri call “imperial
power”, are those they call the “multitudes,”, who condition the
policies of states members of the new tricontinental, as in Latin
America, electing and bringing down their political leaders, and
guiding them towards original and emancipatory policies.46
Beyond the question of individual and combined states of the
new tricontinental, lies that of non-state actors and movements.
These are not yet properly documented in the academic literature,
but they already play a role and seek to play a larger one. I am
referring here in particular to the “alternative globalization”
movement (in French: altermondialisme), which has taken shape
44
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in a series of “world social forums”(WSFs) beginning in Porto
Alegre in January 2001.47 The Charter of Principles of Porto Alegre
proclaimed its opposition to neo-liberalism and to world
domination by narrowly-held capital. The declared institutional
enemies of the movement are those international organizations
which manage the financial and economic affairs of the planet:
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade
Organization, G8 meetings, and so on. In the view of the social
forums, the neo-liberal wave was born with the end, around 1970,
of the “Keynesian” era in which capital, labor and governments
cooperated. This collapse paralleled the decline and fall of the
socialist model, as of the previously attempted third world-oriented
approach (that is to say, the first tricontinental). The political
collapse was accompanied by the historical repression of the
significance of global events, especially those of the late 1960s,
when the original tricontinental was alive and well.48 Those who
acted out the 1968 uprising in France and elsewhere knew what
they wanted: to end the US war in Vietnam and the conditions
that had produced it, that is to say, the transformation of the
international system and the rules governing it. The next generation
of repentant revolutionaries49 re-defined 1968 as a kind of cathartic
and self-absorbed media event staged by bored petty bourgeois
intellectuals, forgetting that it had been accompanied by a
paralyzing nation-wide strike in France, and social movements
of similar power elsewhere.
Clearly, such initiatives, networks, demonstrations and
conferences are not convincing in their presentation of alternatives.
47
 Samir Amin & François Houtart, “Trois défis pour les Forums sociaux,”
Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2006, p.31.
48
 This occultation is admirably traced by Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
49
 The causes and effects of this collective penance are ironically recounted by
Guy Hocquenghem, Lettre ouverte à ceux qui sont passés du col Mao au Rotary,
Paris: Agone, 2003 [1986].
Towards a New Tricontinental?
46
But they are consistent in their logic, and are a legitimate and
integral part of the movement which is taking place, and in which
new champions may emerge singly or together, to challenge the
existing international system. The vulnerability of that system is
shown by the failed policies of the years between 2001 and 2006,
during which the entire project of the Bush administration came
apart, to the extent that one wonders how it can be put together
again. Radical unilateralism has not worked and cannot work,
because of its cultural presuppositions and blind spots. It cannot
work, because of the expected reaction of other international
actors, not simply states. And it cannot work because new powers
are on the rise, which may well emerge in the context of this new
tricontinental paradigm.
After the Fall
The international system, after seeming to become simpler, became
much more complex in the wake of the events set off by the al-
Qaida assault of September 11th, 2001. The latter produced a
discursive, political and military overreach by the USA, Britain
and Israel, in the shape of the Iraqi and Lebanese adventures,
from 2003 to 2006. This precipitation of events actually came to
confirm the kinds of theoretical inputs that dated back to the period
prior to the advent of unipolarity. The sudden shift of 1990 was
surely unpredicted and this has led to a critique of international
relations theory in the shadow of this “failure” to predict the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Such a perception was in itself based
on the Enlightenment premise of unlimited rationality and
progress, in short the scientification of social sciences. If you can
predict in a physical system, such as the astronomical, you should
be able to predict in social systems, for example the international.
In fact, theoretical constraints in the social sciences permit
prediction, but only in a chronologically and geographically
limited fashion, because of the enormously increased number of
variables in the humanities and social sciences.
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Following the collapse of the USSR, the general tendency was once
again to consider the emergent system to be permanent, that is to
say, to be destined to last at least two generations (half a century or
more). The overwhelming nature of US hegemony seemed to
guarantee such an outcome. But a careful reading of the literature
might have yielded a different picture. Paul Kennedy, writing in
the mid-1980s,50 had of course not predicted the collapse of the
Soviet Union, but he had identified the combination of processes
which generally lead to the collapse of great powers, and they were,
as he showed, massively present in the Soviet case. What he had
not done was to identify the importance of conditions pertaining to
the up and coming powers particularly China, but also, it is now
clear, India. Those writing in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet
collapse were correct in worrying about increasing instability after
the end of the bipolar system. But they got it wrong geographically,
because they didn’t take into account the disappearance of the
classical (Eurocentric) Nomos and its replacement by a global one.
They tended to think instability would come from established
important states, notably Germany.51 A factoring of the combination
of population, economic and military factors, combined with the
quest for a paradigm to replace those which had succumbed, is
what suggests the makeup of the new tricontinental.
Edward Said, deconstructing Henry Kissinger’s writings, shows
how for the latter, “the contemporary actuality of relations between
the United States and the so-called Third World (which includes
China, Indochina, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America) is
manifestly a thorny set of problems…”52 The creation of the
tricontinental is, like so many international phenomena, the result
50
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of a combination of push and pull. The emergent tricontinental is
at present making a virtue of what had originally been a necessity,
imposed by the ever diminishing group of great powers.
The Chinese case is well documented and signs of its emergence
were precocious, going back to the time of the breakthrough in
US-Chinese relations under Nixon and Mao Zedong in the early
1970s. By the 1990s it had become commonplace to predict its
emergence as a great power, eventually, but surely not, it was
thought, in the short run, because of poverty and overpopulation.
Prodigious growth and demographic planning changed those
two elements, transforming them into strengths, transforming
China into the world’s fourth economic power, and thus earning
for it a portion of preponderant international economic and
financial power through such organizations as the IMF and
World Bank, which it will increasingly come to co-control along
with a handful of other giants.
As for India, it is the surprise addition to the club, although the
ground was laid from the day the cold war ended, as it was freed
from its symbiotic relationship with Russia, just as the USA found
itself freed from that of Pakistan. Whereas China rose to putative
great power status despite its anti-Russian coalition with the United
States, India recently appeared at the door through its own efforts,
but also thanks to a new post-cold war relationship with the USA.53
This relationship promises to open the door to massive
technological transfers to India, already a technological giant, in
the nuclear field. Although the agents of that fateful rapprochement
were President Clinton and the strongly pro-American former
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the movement was a natural
one. And India, like China before it, did not absolutely require
the new coalition; it had all of the elements of its transformation
in hand anyway. What this shows is that the Westphalian principles
53
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resumed their operation (the liberal Clinton had nothing in
common with the fundamentalist Hindu Vajpayee) in the form of
balancing not long after the Soviet collapse had appeared to bring
them to an end. This event had rendered meaningless for a time
Waltz’s idea that “[i]nternational politics is necessarily a small-
number system…the advantages of subtracting a few and arriving
at two are decisive.”54 On the other hand, he is being proven correct
with his idea that “[t]he expectation is not that a balance, once
achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted,
will be restored in one way or another.”55
India, like China, is unlikely to stand in the shadow of the United
States for long. The conflict over Kashmir with Pakistan is not on
the way to being resolved, and US mediation in that regard is
useless since it has too high a stake in the Pakistani relationship,
because of Afghanistan. India is another emerging giant, and
nothing forces it to seek a single strategic ally to the exclusion of
its own global objectives. Indeed, it does all it can to show that it
is not an enthusiastic member of the anti-Muslim “war on terror,”
but only concerned with the territorial issue of Kashmir, which is
a state-to-state question. It labors daily to maintain good relations
with Arab and Muslim countries in the Middle East.
The list of new states members of the new tricontinental extends
to all of those countries in Latin America who have voted to detach
themselves from the US economic and security system, preceding
and following Chavez’s Venezuela. To date, they include Bolivia,
Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil, each of which has sought out a
particular road to its emancipation: Latin America has not forgotten
the pain inflicted by its American supported military dictators.
In the Middle East, given the extraordinary stakes of the game
and the strategic importance of oil resources, few have dared to
54
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join the tricontinental. Thus far only Iran can be counted a
member, and it is not clear, given the pressures on the regime,
how long this will be, since it may well be willing to purchase its
benevolent neutrality in exchange for American flexibility on
the nuclear issue. As in the theoretical realm (gender perspectives,
Postcolonial and Subaltern Studies, the revision of Neo-Realism)
so in the political field, the large Middle Eastern states, most
particularly the Arab ones, continue to lag in the quest for
emancipation from the great powers. The exemplary exceptions
are to be found in the smallest units, Palestine and Lebanon, and
their example may yet prove decisive in the future, in terms of
the regional prospects of the tricontinental.
Very important developments include the acquisition by Iran of
nuclear energy resources, which scare the West at least as much
because of their economic and political implications, as because of
their military ones. Inevitably, other countries or groups of countries
which can afford it, will go nuclear, acquiring the kind of symbolic
and technological autonomy which accompanies such a
development. And the nuclearization of Iran doesn’t seem to have
unduly frightened its neighbors. On the contrary, Turkey, especially
as it becomes less and less certain of entering the EU in the medium-
term future, shows every intention of getting close to regional and
extra-regional powers of the global South, and thus potentially
contributing, thanks also to its successful mixed form of secular-
religious government, to the specificities of the tricontinental:56
Formally, Turkey remains in the Western camp, but is
increasingly the odd man out. In contrast, Turkey’s
relations with Russia have developed exponentially.
Relations with Iran are also improving. Tehran provides
assistance to Ankara’s efforts to fight the PKK and is a
significant gas supplier. While it is still too early to
56
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talk about a major shift in Turkey, all the ingredients
for a realignment are there.
What distinguishes this new tricontinental is then, on the one hand,
the fact that it is based on economic strengths rather than
weaknesses like the former one. Henry Laurens notes that “the
deadly paradox of [last century’s] Afro-Asianism was its economic
strategy.”57 The author proceeds to show how 20th century
developmentalism actually cemented domination by the North.
This is no longer the case, since members of the three continents
are fully equipped to compete in the era of globalization. Just as
importantly, the new tricontinental is now willing to work with
the legalized international parameters of the post-League UN era.
It accepts the fact that deviant behavior has been criminalized,
and its members continually position themselves so as to be on
the right side of that juridical line, pushing the creator of the line,
the United States, over on to the wrong side, as seen most
dramatically in the proceedings of the UN Security Council leading
up to the US/UK invasion of Iraq. The latter example shows how
the tricontinental knows better than to put itself beyond the pale
by failing to court one or more of the veto-yielding powers (in
2003 it was France and Russia; in the Iranian nuclear dispute,
Russia and China). This is part of the winning, legalized strategy.
One should not of course equate the tricontinental as a whole
with its most vociferous members, as when the Venezuelan
president promises to defend Cuba or Iran if one of them should
be invaded.58 But contrary to previous periods, nowadays most of
the countries and peoples on the sidelines are cheering Chavez,
along with his own people, who still re-elect him and his supporters
at every occasion. This has strong symbolic significance, as did
the US failure to carry the Security Council, even its most
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vulnerable third world members, and despite bluster and threats,
in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. Meantime, the US
administration complains, as well it might, that the UN has turned
against it, whether because the Secretary General declared the
US war in Iraq “illegal,” or because the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN agency, denounced “outrageous”
inaccuracies in US claims about Iranian plans for building nuclear
weapons.59 And while one should not make too much of it, there
is a distinct revival of interest in such allegedly outmoded
organizations as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of cold war
fame, judging by the strong attendance of its 118 members at the
14th summit of the NAM in Havana, and their concern to have a
successful meeting.60
In the words of Ignacio Ramonet, Director of Le Monde
Diplomatique, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the historic
Bandung meeting, which showed the way towards the original
non-aligned movement and tricontinental,61
The political objective underpinning the [World Social
Forum] is radical in its modernity. Whereas the United
Nations provides a forum for states or governments –
the structures of power, the WSF aims to bring together,
for the first time in history, an embryonic assembly
representative of all humanity.
Interestingly, Ramonet recognizes the importance of an alliance
between peoples and states, in this context, when he notes that
the WSF meeting of 2006 in Caracas, “will be particularly
impassioned in the Venezuelan capital where, for the first time,
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the WSF will come into direct contact with the reforms introduced
by President Hugo Chavez.”
To this perspective should here be added the contributions of
gender-based analyses, which have added significantly to our
understanding of international relations, and if combined to the
notion of the rising tricontinental, with its third world perspective,
they have even more to offer, given the direct and serious
consequences of structural adjustment policies and the relocation
of factories from the North to the South as well as the mass
migration of women involved in services from housekeeping to
prostitution, from east to west and south to north (South East Asia
to the Gulf, Latin America to the USA, Eastern to Western Europe).
At the theoretical level, the gender perspective is based on the
critique of realist theory, for example with Ann Tickner’s
commentary on Hans Morgenthau.62 She takes his guiding
principles of international relations (as expounded in Politics
Among Nations) and points out their emphasis on “objectivity”
and “power” as well as the axiom of the continuation of the existing
public sphere, which discriminates against women. Leaving her
own theoretical presuppositions aside (a feminist standpoint
divorced from social or cultural factors, and thus essentialist in
the sense that she tends to posit a distinctly “female” and a
distinctly “male” perspective, something more than problematic
in the social sciences) this is a valuable contribution to the critique
of international relations, based on the discipline’s discourse. The
potential for mobilizing women as well as men is therefore also
more of a reality.
The same potential exists in the case of the domestic and
international politics of religion. In the Middle East, it is political
Islam that currently struggles for democracy and bears potential
for change. This is a time when even in Western Europe, one
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speaks of a trend towards “desecularization” of political thought.
It has been thus far limited to the arena occupied by the politicians,
taking Britain as an example, with the strident competition for
the Christian identity high-ground thinly disguised as secularism,
in the quest for position and votes. Judging from history, it can be
foreseen that mainstream academia will follow. Liberation
theology has a revived potential in the context of desecularization,
and in that respect, “liberation Islam” is a largely untested
perspective, but towards which there is some opening.
Further consolidating this combination of state and non-state
actors, as well as types of analyses, pushing in the direction of
global paradigmatic change, is the capital transformation of the
flow of information. Despite the best efforts of such venues as
UNESCO63 it was always one way, from north to south; but with
the breakthrough achieved by Al-Jazeera TV channel in the past
decade, a series of media outlets has come into existence, most
especially in the audio-visual field, that have contributed, if not
to reversing, at least to balancing, the flow (although none of them
have come close yet to matching the independence and courage
of Al-Jazeera,64 this is simply a matter of time). There is now a
south-north and a south-south flow of information which can only
help to strengthen those forces seeking to create a new
intercontinental paradigm.
The reaction of the previously hegemonic power and its
predecessor as hegemon and nonetheless close ally is of course
also to be expected. Indeed, the Bush administration and Blair
government have redefined international politics as a zero-sum
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game, for the first time. The war against terrorism is seen as a
one thousand and one night (that is to say, an infinitely long)
process, one that will never end, the long adherence to
international juridification,  going back to the League, now being
abandoned. As proclaimed by Bush on September 11th, 2006 from
the Oval Office, the nation was now engaged in a “struggle to
preserve civilization.”65 In this he was aping Blair’s 21 March
2006 speech at the Foreign Policy Centre in London, when he
said “[t]his is not a clash between civilizations, it is a clash about
civilization. It is the age-old battle between progress and
reaction…” (http://fpc.org.uk/events/past/231). To their support
came Pope Benedict XVI with his notorious lecture at Regensburg
University on September 12th, 2006. just one day after Bush’s
civilization speech, he chose to quote a Byzantine Emperor’s
statement that the Prophet Muhammad had brought nothing new
that wasn’t evil and inhuman. Proving that he shared that vision,
the Pope added that the Koranic injunction against spreading
religion by force (Surah 2, 256: “There is no compulsion in
religion”) was an early quote, dating back to a time when the
Prophet was still “powerless and under threat,” that is to say, a
deceitful statement.66 The Pope, faced with a massive response
that showed just how inexperienced he was politically, dropped
out of the Anglo-American crusade quickly, paying as ransom a
sudden reversal of views regarding Turkish admission to the EU,
which he now supports.
If these international actors are concerned, it is because they are
on the defensive. This is due to the variety of conditions which
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have come together in the contemporary era, including the
juridification of the international system, the fall of classical
paradigms, the political and therefore juridical contestation of US
foreign policies, and the rise of a potential new tricontinental
movement combining states, some of which are possessed of
enormous economic, human and military might, seconded by
popular transnational movements, able and perhaps willing to forge
a new and original role for itself, and a new paradigm as well.
What remains to be seen is whether the countries that make up
the potential steering committee of the Tricontinental will
understand that it is in their interests to act in concert. The signs
are marginally positive, and should this turn out to be true, the
collapse of the three dominant paradigms, and the unipolar
moment, will turn out to have been of short duration (as posited
by neo-realism) and the future of the planet will be determined
by those who represent its crushing majority, and at the same
time, a fair share of its natural as well as its economic,
technological and financial resources.
